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Discussion of ‘How does changing 
measurement change management 
behaviour? A review of the evidence’ 
Neil Chisman* 
I would like to thank Anne Beatty for an illumi- 
nating and thought-provoking address. I have a 
few brief observations and questions under these 
five headings: 
1.  Why do people complain? Aren’t the behaviour 
changes always a good thing? 
2. Are there differences between the UK and the 
US? 
3. What are the non-economic motives for behav- 
iour change? 
4. What should we do about this? 
5. What should standard setters do? 
To take the first point: why do people complain; 
are not behaviour changes always a good thing? I 
know that Anne said more research was needed. I 
understand that - I used to be an academic myself. 
I was not very good at it because I found I had no 
trouble forming opinions in the complete absence 
of facts! 
Doubtless accounting standards changes cause 
changes in behaviour. I’ve done it and I’ve changed 
behaviour as a result of an accounting standard 
change. I am not proud of it - I can only plead that 
I was very young at the time! I cannot think of a 
single case where such a behaviour change was a 
bad thing, or even an unintended consequence. For 
example, the standard dealing with off-balance 
sheet financing was overtly aimed at stamping out 
bad practice. Banks were openly marketing 
schemes to circumvent accounting standards. 
Prudent finance directors might not have liked 
them, but they could not refuse their pushy chief 
executives. Consequently, companies carried risks 
that they did not understand and that investors did 
not understand. The standard stopped all of that. 
Or pensions accounting: I was a member of the 
Financial Reporting Council when the UK 
Accounting Standards Board introduced account- 
ing standard FRS17 Retirement Benefits. A high- 
profile council member made an impassioned 
~ 
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address saying that it would be the death of the 
British defined benefit pension scheme. A much 
lower-profile member responded that this would 
be a good thing because such schemes were wide- 
ly misunderstood and mismanaged. It did indeed 
cause the decline of defined benefit schemes; I be- 
lieve that was because managements and investors 
began better to understand the liability that they 
were carrying. 
If a proposed accounting change is foreseen to 
cause a bad change in behaviour, then standard 
setters should respond to comment to that effect in 
the discussion phase, and I think they do. Perhaps 
the impassioned debate reflects differences of 
opinion on whether the foreseen behaviour change 
is a good or a bad thing. 
There were some elements in Anne’s presenta- 
tion that made me ask if there were differences be- 
tween the UK and the US. For example, do 
bonuses and remuneration really drive undesirable 
behaviour changes? I suppose it is not completely 
out of the question here in the UK. However, 
bonuses are normally awarded at the discretion of 
the remuneration committee, who would usually 
be expected to adjust for any engineered results, 
and the behaviour changes themselves are likely to 
be matters reserved for the full board. 
Consequently, it is not really open to executive 
directors to tinker with the results without the 
agreement of non-executives merely to enhance 
bonus payments. Indeed, the whole area of win- 
dow-dressing, involving such actions as making 
and releasing provisions to smooth the results, is 
much more constrained than it once was. 
From this side of the Atlantic it can seem that the 
‘show me where it says I can’t do this’ mentality is 
quite rife in the US. It may indeed be less common 
over here now, but we must not forget that during 
the 1980s disciplines were disgraceful in the UK. 
It was perfectly normal to look for ways to cir- 
cumvent accounting standards and there were 
some awful scandals. But there was a thorough 
clean-up in the 1990s, with David Tweedie at the 
ASB, with the Cadbury Committee on Corporate 
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Governance, and with the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel scaring people to death. My percep- 
tion is that it is now quite unusual to push the 
boundaries. 
What, then, are the non-economic motives for 
behaviour change? Behaviour might change sim- 
ply because management wants to do the right 
thing, both in the positive sense of wanting to earn 
one’s place in Heaven, and in the negative sense of 
protecting one’s back and not wanting one’s face 
on the front page of a tabloid newspaper. 
Managements do care deeply about their reputa- 
tions. 
Anne mentioned that the debt:equity ratio, 
which we call gearing and which Anne calls lever- 
age, is a poor proxy for tightness of debt 
covenants. I do not think it is any proxy at all; it is 
actually more stringent and more important. It is 
usually gearing that drives the behaviour change 
and not debt covenants. Debt:equity ratio is a 
guide to long-term financing stability, an indica- 
tion that you are likely always to be able to borrow. 
I would expect a company’s policy on gearing to 
be tighter than the debt covenants. It would be rea- 
sonable, for example, for a company to set a poli- 
cy that the acceptable range is from 40% to 60%; 
any lower - as Anne’s example quoted - would ap- 
pear as unambitious, with the company needing to 
find good investments or return cash to sharehold- 
ers. Any higher and the route back down must be 
clear. This is where the standard on off-balance 
sheet financing had its effect by demonstrating that 
companies’ gearing had been pushed past accept- 
able upper gearing limits. 
Perhaps the best and the most benign motive for 
behaviour change is simply increased understand- 
ing of the issues leading to better decisions. In my 
experience, this is the most common - and you 
might say that this is what accounting standards 
are actually for. 
Behaviour change happens because people do 
not always act rationally in practice, and markets 
are far from perfect. In principle, all decisions 
within a company should be made by selecting the 
option which maximises the net present value of 
future cash flows, either directly by maximising 
the cash flows themselves or by lowering risk and 
the weighted average cost of capital. 
If people consistently acted rationally in this 
way, then an accounting change would not induce 
a behavioural change. When it does, it implies that 
there was something wrong previously, that some 
area of irrational decision-making is being correct- 
ed. Hence the demise of the defined benefit pen- 
sions, as people understood the liability more 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
completely, and the cessation of off-balance sheet 
financing as people understood better the risk of 
excessive gearing. 
It is not only on the management side that better 
understanding is required. Ten years ago, there 
was an investor-driven move for hotel companies 
to sell big hotels and retain a management con- 
tract. It was argued that a revenue stream on ‘no 
capital employed’ had to be good business. 
Actually, this is usually value destroying because 
there are substantial extra costs, the revenue 
stream is no longer a perpetuity, and most of the 
benefit of improved trading performance passes to 
the new owner. Investors can and do bring irra- 
tional pressure to bear on managements. Indeed, 
investors are often cited as being more than will- 
ing participants in the strategy that brought down 
Marconi. 
What, therefore, do we need to do? We must 
make a fundamental change in the way we account 
and report, in order to give both sides - manage- 
ment and investors - greater clarity and under- 
standing that what matters is the net present value 
of future cash flows. If accounting standards can 
make the dialogue between investors and manage- 
ments focus rationally and constructively on value 
creation rather than short-term profits, then there 
will be much beneficial behaviour change and we 
will all get richer. 
What should standard setters do? Anne quoted 
Jim Leisenring as saying: ‘Standard setters must 
continue to produce standards giving neutral deci- 
sion-useful information,’ and I agree with that. 
Decisions will then become more rational, and any 
changes in behaviour will be beneficial. 
Let’s not underestimate the task. Global stan- 
dards are far from harmonised, and even the best 
are not yet very decision-useful. Progress is ham- 
pered by market participants’ inability to agree, to 
reach a consensus, even on trivia like terminology. 
We have bickering; woolly thinking; partisan posi- 
tions; poor to non-existent listening skills; argu- 
ments about the number of angels that can dance 
on a pinhead; and even political interference. 
The standard setters are uniquely placed to rise 
above all this, to see the big picture, to show tech- 
nical excellence, to lead opinion and to drive con- 
sensus about what needs to be done. The standard 
setters must not let themselves get bogged down in 
the trivia that we mere mortals indulge in; other- 
wise we will make no progress. The standard 
setters must lead - they must lead the world to- 
wards harmonised, high quality, decision-useful 
accounting standards, and it would be nice if that 
could be soon. 
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